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Fusion centers provide interdisciplinary expertise and situational awareness to inform decision-making at all levels of government. They conduct analysis and facilitate information sharing while assisting law enforcement and homeland security partners in preventing, protecting against, and responding to crime and terrorism.
-Department of Homeland Security 1 This paper will address the strategic question of whether we are "more safe as a nation now than before" with regards to Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) involvement with and development of State Fusion Centers (SFCs). It will begin with the most current and common definition of the existing network between DHS and the State Fusion Centers, and provide a brief history of the pre-9/11 environment and the post-9/11 development and involvement of DHS in State Fusion Centers. It will then define four impediments, identified during research that the DHS and SFCs face as they move toward the national network of information sharing and analysis imagined. The impediments are the lack of federal forcing functions for improvement, DHS internal policies and politics, cultural challenges between state and federal authorities, and issues with the funding and sustainment for the future. The paper will conclude with proposed recommendations for improvement using the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities (DOTLMPF) rubric and a discussion of risk.
Is the US Safer due to the establishment of Fusion Centers?
After ten plus years of investment should we be safer than we are now? What gaps have fusion centers filled from a federal to local level, and can they be measured?
There is no easy way to answer these questions without an event on the scale and magnitude of 9/11. The familiar conclusion of the 9/11 Commission that cited a lack of 2 information sharing and intelligence analysis at both state and federal levels, led to the creation of DHS in 2002 and a study to develop SFCs. During the creation of state centers in 2003 much effort was spent, at both the federal and state levels, dissecting the methods of information sharing and dissemination, red teaming of critical infrastructure, and processes for joining of state and federal resources. This effort was based on a series of presumptions that the next terrorist attacks against the homeland would have some internal element and have some discernible criminal facet that would be identifiable and subsequently preventable through a transparent sharing and analysis of information. The ability to leverage information at all levels was the main concern as DHS and the SFCs continued to develop and mature. analyst. During this developmental time, however, the federal, specifically DHS, management and footprint continued to vary based on state location and proximity to federally identified high threat areas. The FBI remained the main counterterrorism entity with both an analytical and execution arm and whose JTTF size and capability post 9/11 had grown to include task forces "based in 103 cities nationwide, including at least one in each of the 56 field offices." 7 Due to the rapidity with which the network was envisioned and created, developmental problems ranging from management, priorities, and mission statements to actual physical locations and infrastructure development continued to grow and evolve.
The Lack of Federal Forcing Functions
The first impediment identified is the lack of federal forcing functions to improve the national network and under-achieving state centers. This begins with a simple understanding between DHS and the SFCs that a hierarchical problem exists and needs to be corrected. The most notable concern in this area is that DHS does not currently appear to possess a clear understanding of the disparity in capability between the SFCs that comprise the national network and subsequently does not know how to invest in remedies without appearing to meddle in state affairs. While legislation grants oversight, audits, and inspections to DHS for the development and maturation of the 6 national network, there currently are no provisions to impose penalties on SFCs for a failure to perform to standards. There is no ability for the DHS to change a priority or enforce/reinforce a decision made outside of the state. Best practices can either be taken or discarded, procedures followed or not. Conversely, there are also no federal incentives for a SFC to show progress among the numerous metrics and measures of performance. As the fusion centers are state owned, DHS possess no carrot-or-stick capability, and the Secretary of the DHS has little to no decision making authority or ability to direct information gathering and analysis within the homeland outside of DHS.
The current way in which the DHS exerts influence on a state center to improve is purely political and a delicate balancing act between guiding without the perception of dictating. The implications of which include that if the SFCs are the basis for the national network, and the SFCs have varying degrees of capability and no timeline for effective stand up, when will the national network be ready? During the author's visit to one SFC it was made very apparent that the state owned the center and directed its effort against state priorities.
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There is additionally no federal requirement for the standardization of centers in terms of physical setup, information architecture baselines, or dissemination methods.
Reporting and dissemination methods and policies governing the mountain of data are still incomplete. 
Inadequate DHS Internal Policies and Processes
The most serious issue, a byproduct of the rapid construction but subsequent slow maturation of both DHS and the network, is continued inconsistent system development without a clear understanding of the problem or the policies and processes to address it. This lack of a strategy was specifically noted in the 2008 CRS report that stated, "some might argue that the rise of state and regional fusion centers may have been premature -that is, the establishment of these entities in the absence of a common understanding of the underlying discipline. Additionally, competition exists between federal agencies that has the potential to create issues with state entities. For example, when the FBI and the DHS personnel at the SFC are in competition for information or investigative primacy, the FBI possesses the right of first refusal over jurisdiction and subsequently information management.
The most notable benefit of the FBI is that it has established systems and networks for reporting and analysis that subsequently feed both the state and national intelligence community. The risk is in the immediate information sharing in that the FBI also has the ability to deny information/intelligence using clearances/access using the need-to-know caveat. This access to information problem between FBI and DHS personnel was first identified in the 2008 GAO report that cited a continued "lack of reciprocity" and "an inability or unwillingness on the part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the FBI to work effectively together." 15 Arguments against fusion centers often center around the idea that such centers are essentially pre-emptive law enforcement -that intelligence gathered in the absence of a criminal predicate is unlawfully gathered intelligence. The argument is that the further law enforcement, public safety and private sector representatives get away from a criminal predicate, the greater the chances that civil liberties may be violated. 17 Numerous examples exist of fusion centers erroneously reporting on state and local events that possessed no homeland or even criminal threat. Describing events such as 13 political protests and rallies and the people attending them as having the potential to either be or spawn domestic terrorism activity created the potential for an entry in the national TIDE database. And as the Constitution Project wrote, "In addition, the information-sharing function of fusion centers has the potential to multiply the harm caused by profiling, because improperly acquired information in one fusion center can readily be disseminated to other fusion centers, law enforcement agencies and federal intelligence agencies." 18 Not only does this mean that the information in databases from state to federal levels is potentially corrupt, but also that it has the propensity to be shared and recreated in other databases around the country releasing an individual's Personally Identifiable Information. Frequently, erroneous entry of information in TIDE has generated investigations at either the state or federal level to prove or disproved links to potential terrorist acts or networks. These investigations have continued for years, wasting precious time and resources to purge the report and its duplicative copies on numerous systems.
Undisciplined Funding and Sustainment
The federal government directed money at the counterterrorism problem without the systems and processes in place to either account for expenditures or measure success or improvement. Currently, DHS possesses no effective audit trail to establish what was purchased against the funding request. Additionally, former Secretary
Chertoff's noted that DHS has not "signed on to fund fusion centers in perpetuity." 19 This sets up long-term funding issues that may prove to be fatal to the centers, or when pressed by DHS officials, the center's director conceded that they were to be used for the monitoring of news and calendar display. In 2010 this center was cited as "ranking below the national average in 9 of 12 capabilities," 24 which raises the same issues as with NEORFC.
Recommendations
The first item to address in order to begin to resolve these issues is the doctrine development and organization of DHS. There currently is no document at the government level that provides a SFC with guidelines as to what is the right or wrong way ahead. Both DHS and SFCs require legislation that will drive doctrine development that will delineate both responsibility and accountability across all functions. As noted earlier there is no clear chain of command between the state and federal level that bears ultimate responsibility for the success or failure of the national network. The current set of conditions allows both federal and state entities to blame confusing policies, the lack of appropriate funding or personnel, or each other for the lack of
progress. An additional piece of legislation should be passed that gives the federal government, specifically DHS, the authority to develop and maintain the network without caveat. This legislation should also have a timeline associated with penalties that initially focus on DHS and other federal entities support to the counterterrorism mission, but that can also be extended to other lines of funding and support if deemed appropriate.
The second issue concerns the inadequate NNMM processes, specifically with the development of the national network along the prescribed model. The lack of a timeline to achieve the ultimate goal of a "mature" status must be corrected as well as development of timelines to achieve both the "emerging" and "enhanced" thresholds.
There should be no requirement to either adapt or change the four CoCs or ECs as they adequately capture and facilitate growth along the model without constraint. What must continue to occur is the DHS and state inspection and exercise process to ensure that at all levels information is accurately shared and synthesized.
The third issue of cultural challenges in leadership and management of information is perhaps the most difficult to address. As the choice of leadership of a SFC is ultimately the decision of the state, the federal government rightly has no sway in the matter. What should be weighed is the decision for assignment of the operational and analytical arms in the SFC with duty descriptions and experience caveats. What must be carefully articulated and codified are the chains of command for internal and external events so as not to replicate the current reporting and chain of command issues. FBI and DHS authorities, at both the state and federal level, must be coordinated with one federal body identified as the primary authority. Jurisdiction issues, clearances, sharing practices, and leadership issues between the SFCs, FBI, and DHS employees must be conclusively sorted out. Database transparency and interoperability between federal and state systems must be immediately corrected and a federal standard applied. Privacy rights and civil liberties accountability must continue to be addressed clearly at all levels. The government must commit the necessary time and resources to correctly articulate its privacy policies and processes to the public.
The last issue of undisciplined funding and sustainment covers the entirety of the DOTMLPF spectrum. With financial resources declining and anticipated to remain low for the next five years, the appetite for the frivolous spending of the public dollar will be remote. The current HSGP grant program must be amended to create a funding line specific to developments in homeland security and carrying more stringent guidelines.
This funding line should require project approval at both DHS and state for allocation and include a verification of usage audit processes.
Risk
The most immediate risk facing the national network is undoubtedly a missed or undiagnosed terrorist attack against the homeland -a terrorist attack that possessed a discernible criminal element within the homeland and was preventable through proper information sharing and analysis, from the local to federal levels. What would be equally devastating would be a loss of faith in the national network between state and federal entities. That failure might develop into a loss in public confidence in the ability of the government to protect its citizens as demonstrated by a reporter with the Richmond Times-Dispatch who began his article on SFCs as "Feds wasting money on confusion centers." 25 The risk of the continued misuse of federal or state funds in the current fiscally austere environment is that it might result in the elimination of federal funding and subsequent loss in information sharing and analysis. Without the continued funding support, simple fiscal math leads to regionalization of the centers or the states returning the centers to an internally based organization. In either case the potential exists of recreating a gap in situational awareness between the state and federal level.
Conclusion
Although SFCs have made tremendous strides, the nation is not yet as secure as it might be. Continued effort to improve the fusion centers is imperative. Another review of the current national network and abilities of the state of fusion centers is soon to be published. This DHS 2012 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report will be vital to reestablishing the baseline for SFCs, assessing the current strategy and defining a way ahead for the national network. Hopefully, the people responsible for the system will take note and act on the reviewer's recommendations.
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